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ARE JAPANESE STOCK PRICES TOO HIGH?
ABSTRACT
The difference between reported price-earnings ratios in the United
States and Japan is not as puzzling as it appears at first glance. Nearly
half the disparity is caused by differences in accounting practices with
respect to consolidation of earnings from subsidiariesand depreciation of
fixed assets. If Japanese firms used U.S. accounting rules, we estimate that
the P/E ratio for the Tokyo Stock Exchange would have been 32.1, not the
reported 54.3, at the end of 1988. Accounting differences are unable,
however, to explain the sharp rise in the Japanese stock market duringthe
mid-1980s. Changes in required returns on equities, or in investor expecta-
tions of future growth for Japanese firms, must be invoked to explain this
phenomenon. Real interest rates declined during the period of rapid price
increase, but there is little evidence that growth expectations became more
optimistic. The real interest rate changes do not, however, appear large
enough to fully account for the change in stock prices.
Kenneth R. French
University of Chicago
Graduate School of Business







Cambridge, MA 02139Japanese equities trade at a higher earnings multiple than shares in any
other major equity market. At the end of 1989, the price-earnings ratio for
the Nomura Research Institute (NRI) 350, a broad index of Japanese nonfinan-
cial firms, was 53.7. The comparable ratio for the Standard and Poor's
Industrial index of Anerican stocks was 15.0, and the average P/E ratio for
all nations except Japan in the Morgan Stanley-Capital International database
was 13.6.
The large difference between price-earnings ratios in Japan and other
markets is a recent phenomenon. In the early 1970s, Japanese P/E ratios were
below p/Es in the United States. Between 1973 and 1985, Japanese P/Es were
approximately twice those of the United States. Most of the recent divergence
between the two P/Es occurred in 1986, when the Japanese ratio doubled from
29.4 to 58.6 while the U.S. P/E increased by only 20%, from 15.4 to 18.7.
The developments of the last decade in the Tokyo stock market have led
many analysts to ask if high Japanese price-earnings ratios are consistent
with much lower P/Es in other nations. Differences could be attributed to
differential accounting practices and tax rules which complicate the interna-
tional comparison of P/Es, or to divergences in required returns or expected
earnings growth. This paper examines the most important differences between
U.S. and Japanese financial accounting practices and tries to "correct"
Japanese P/Es for comparison with U.S. values. We then ask whether the rapid
growth in share values during the 1980s can be traced to fundamentals such as
falling investor discount rates or increased growth expectations.
This paper is divided into five sections. The first presents a stylized
overview of the U.S. and Japanese equity markets. We report the price-
earnings and dividend-price ratios in both countries, as well as information
on the size of each equity market, the volume of trade, and the composition of
shareownership. The second section relates the rise in Japanese share pricesto the equally dramatic increase in land values. The escalation of Japanese
land prices is simply another manifestation of recently-rising price-earnings
multiples for assets in Japan relative to those elsewhere. Our analysis
focuses on stock market valuation because available data on common stocks are
far better than data on the cash flows from land and other real assets.
Section three explores the influence of accounting differences on the
disparity between the price-earnings ratios of the two countries. We show
that several factors make Japanese price-earnings ratios systematically higher
than their U.S. counterparts, but none of these factors can account for the
recent increase in Japanese P/E ratios. Section four examines differences in
required after-tax returns and expected growth rates in the two countries. We
first calibrate the changes in discount factors and growth expectations that
would be needed to explain the recent increase in Japanese share values. We
then consider various proxies for actual changes in required returns and
growth expectations. We find that rather extreme assumptions would be needed
to explain the post-1985 increase in Japanese share prices. There is a brief
conclusion.
1. Overvew of Japanese and U.S. Eguity Markets
The relative importance of the Japanese and U.S. equity markets has
shifted dramatically during the last two decades, the result of rapid growth
in Japanese share prices and depreciation of the dollar. This section
provides background information on these markets.
1.1 Market Size
The widely cited data from Morgan Stanley-Capital International (MSCI)
Persoectives and other data sources imply that the Japanese equity market was
55% larger than the U.S. market at the end of 1988. However, these data
2provide a misleading measure of relative market capitalization for two
reasons. First, the U.S. data include only shares listed on the New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE), thereby capturing less than 85% of the market value of
listed U.S. shares.) A second and more important problem is that the
reported market values are not adjusted for intercorporate share ownership,
which causes double-counting of corporate shares. Because such cross-owner-
ship is much more prevalent in Japan than in the United States, the size of
the Japanese equity market is significantly overstated.2
An example illustrates the potential difficulty. Consider an economy
with two firms, A and B, each with assets worth $100. If each firm relies
exclusively on equity financing and there is no intercorporate ownership, the
total value of traded equity will be $200. Suppose firm B now issues $50 in
new shares and uses the proceeds to purchase one half of the equity in firm A.
This transaction increases the market value of B to $150 ($100 in physical
assets and $50 in shares of A), without affecting the market value of A.
Although the value of the underlying productive assets remains unchanged at
$200, the intercorporate purchase of stock raises the aarent value of the
market to $250.
1The market value of equity listed on the NYSE was $2088.7 billion in 1987,
while the value of equity listed on the American Stock Exchange and other
regional exchanges was $68.6 billion. Shares of domestic corporations
(excluding mutual funds) traded in the NASDAQ over-the-counter market were
valued at $325.5 billion [U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Statistical
Bulletin (1988) and National Association of Securities Dealers Yearbook
(1988)]. The over-the-counter market is less important in Japan. For
example, in 1986 the volume of shares traded on the First Section of the Tokyo
Stock Exchange was 772 times the volume in the Tokyo OTC market [Japan
Securities Research Institute (1988)].
2MacDonald (1989) illustrates this point with calculations for a set of
particular .Japanese companies.
3The apparent market value overstates the value of the firms' underlying
assets because half of A's assets are included in the equity of both firm A
and firm B. One can eliminate this double-counting and get an accurate
estimate of the underlying asset value by measuring only the value of equity
held outside the corporate sector. In our example, the public holds $50 of A
and $150 of B, so the value of shares held outside the corporate sector is
$200, the value of the underlying assets. More generally, the value of the
equity held outside the corporate sector is
(1) VOutside —(ls)*VTotal
where s is the fraction of the stock held by firms and VTotal is the total
value of equity, including corporate crossholdings.
Table 1 reports data on the aggregate ownership of traded shares in both
the United States and Japan.3 In the United States, individuals hold about
half of the outstanding equity either directly or through mutual funds.
Intercorporate equity holdings account for only one seventh of total equity.
This fraction excludes holdings by defined-benefit pension plans. The assets
of these plans are arguably assets of the shareholders; including them as
corporate cross-holdings would raise the intercorporate ownership to over
twenty percent. Insurance companies, with holdings for both insurance
operations and pension plans, own 23.9% of the market. The remaining equity
3The weights for the U.S. in Table 2 differ from the equityownership weights
in the Flow of Funds for two reasons. First, intercorporate shareholdings are
"netted out" of the Flow of Funds, so nonfinancial firms appear with no equity
holdings except a small stake in mutual funds. Following Tn (1971), we use
IRS data on the ratio of dividends paid by U.S. corporations to domestic
dividends received by u.s. corporations to estimate intercorporate holdings.
Second, the Flow of Funds data on equity include stock in closely held
corporations, worth $600 billion in 1987. Since we are concerned with
marketable securities, we exclude this component. We assume that all closely
held corporations are owned directly by individuals in removing this class of
equity from the Flow of Funds aggregates.
4holdings are diverse, Slightly more than 6% of the equity is held by foreig-
n-
ers and a similar fraction held by state and local government pension funds.
Corporations of various kinds hold nearly two thirds of the equity in
Japan. These holdings includes nonfinancial corporations (30%), banks (20%),
and insurance companies (17%). Direct individual holdings account for only
one fifth of the market value of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (TSE). Moreover,
the fraction of the Japanese market held by individuals has declined through
time, from nearly 60% at the beginning of the 1950s to only 20% today.
Table 2 presents a detailed example of cross-ownership, the case of the
Toyota Motor Company. Toyota owns more than 40% of four other firms on the
TSE First Section, and at least five percent of twenty-two other companies.
Most of these firms supply Toyota with inputs. In turn, several banks own
nearly 30% of Toyota's stock. For many other firms, especially those which,
unlike Toyota, are part of loosely-affiliated corporate groups, the degree of
intercorporate holding is substantially greater.4
Table 3 presents both unadjusted and corrected measures of stock market
value in the U.S. and Japan. The first two columns report unadjusted data,
drawn from MSCI. Columns three and four report the value of Japanese and U.S.
equity markets adjusted for intercorporate holdings. The adjustments have a
surprising effect: even at the end of 1988, the market value of the outside
equity in the Japanese market was smaller than that in the United States. Our
adjusted values stand in striking contrast to the Morgan Stanley data. The
market values reported by MSCI in December 1988 (1989) imply that the world
equity shares of Japan and the United States are 44% (39.6%) and 29% (30.6%).
4Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1989) discuss the linkages among firms in
these groups and how it affects their financial behavior.
SOur adjusted data reverse this ranking: the U.S. accounts for 35.9% of the
world equity portfolio, and Japan for 28.7%, at the end of 1988,For 1989,
the comparable fractions are 37.7% and 25.0%. These findings suggest that
portfolio allocation rules based on the most widely used measures of market
value, the MSCI indices, significantly overstate the importance of Japanese
relative to U.S. equities.
1.2 Valuation, Trading, and Leverage Trends
Table 4 presents price-earnings ratios and dividend-price ratios for the
NRI 350 index of nonfinancial Japanese firms and for the S&P Industrial index
of nonfinancial American firms.5 The disparity between Japanese and U.S. P/E
ratios is apparent. Between 1974 and 1984, the Japanese P/E was about twice
the U.S. P/E. During 1986, however, the Japanese P/E ratio doubled from 29.4
to 58.6, while the U.S. ratio increased by 21%, from 15.4 to 18.7. There also
are large differences between the recent Japanese and American dividend/price
ratios. The dividend yields are comparable in 1970, with values of 3.9% in
Japan and 3.3% in the U.S. The U.S. dividend yield exhibits no particular
trend over the 1970-88 period. In contrast, the Japanese dividend yield
declines systematically. The dividend yields at the end of 1988 are 3.0% in
5We use the NRI 350 because other major indices of the Japanese market have
limitations for our purposes. The aggregate P/E ratio for the First Section
of the TSE includes financial finns, for which accounting issues are more
complex than they are for nonfinancials. The MSCI indices also include
financials. In addition they include consolidated earnings for some firms,
and unconsolidated earnings for others. The average P/E ratio reported in the
Daiwa Analysts Guide is the ratio of the average price and average earnings
based on number of shares outstanding, not value, so it is less representative
of the value-weighted market than the NM measure. The TSE, MSCI, and Daiwa
P/E ratios were 58.3, 52.7, and 82.4 at the end of 1987. The comparable ratio
for the NM 350 was 50.4. while some measures of aggregate Japanese P/Es were
affected when the Nippon Telephone and Telegraph Company went public in 1987
with a price/earnings ratio of 285, this firm is not included in the NRI 350
index.
6the U.S. and 0.6% in Japan.
Turnover rates, measured as the value of shares traded as a fraction of
market capitalization, are similar on the NYSE and the TSE. Turnover rates
for 1986-88 are .672, .806, and .687 in Tokyo and .624, .852, and .582 in New
York. (See the 1988 TSE Fact Book and the 1988 NYSE Fact Book.) Thus, in two
of the last three years of our sample, the turnover rate is higher in Tokyo
than in New York.
Foreigners were net sellers of Japanese stocks during the period of most
rapid price appreciation. Foreign equity ownership of U.S. stocks increased
during both the 1970s and the 1980s, from 3.7% of the market in 1970 to 7.2%
in 1988. Foreign holdings of Japanese stock also increased between the mid-
1970s and the early l980s, growing from less than 2.7% in 1978 to 8.8% in
1984. Since then, foreigners have been net sellers of Japanese equities. By
1988 foreign holdings of Japanese equities (4.8%) were only 55% of their
previous peak value. This may reflect the perception outside Japan that
Japanese equities have been overpriced throughout the mid-l980s. This
sentiment may also be reflected in the heavytradingactivity in recently-
introduced put options on the Japanese market ]Norris (1990)], which doubled
in value during their first few weeks of trading despite relatively small
changes in the value of the underlying index.
Some have argued that the large stock returns and high P/E ratios in
Japan are the result of high debt-equity ratios. This explanation is incon-
sistent with the debt-equity ratios reported in Table 4. These ratios are
book debt divided by the market value of equity. In Japan, where most debt is
short-term, the differential between market and book values for debt is small.
Thedivergence could be larger for the United States. The American debt-
equity ratios exhibit no particular trend, varying between .48 (1972) and1.04
7(1974). In contrast, Japanese debt-equity ratios decline during the sample
period, from 1.63 in 1970 and 2.23 in 1972, to .36 in 1988. Jhile Japanese
debt-equity ratios are substantially higher than their U.S. counterparts
during the 1970s, they are significantly below U.S. debt-equity ratios during
the critical 1986-88 period.
2. Javanese Share Prices and Land Values
Although the price-earnings ratio for Japanese shares exceeds that for
equities traded on other markets, several recent studies [Daiwa (1989),
Hayashi and Inoue (1990), Hoshi and Kayshap (1990), and Japan Securities
Research Institute (1989)] have reported that Tobin's (1969) "q", the ratio of
the market value of Japanese firms to the replacement cost of their assets, is
less than or equal to unity. The recent increase in Japanese equity values
coincides with a rapid increase in Japanese land prices. Table S presents
data on the composition of physical assets for U.S. and Japanese nonfinancial
corporations at the end of 1984 and the end of 1987. Land accounts for more
than half of the tangible assets of Japanese firms, compared with just over
twelve percent for U.S. corporations. Moreover, the value of Japanese
corporate land holdings nearly doubled between 1984 and 1987, and prices have
increased further since then.
The observation that land prices have risen in tandem with stock prices
does not explain why assets trade at higher multiples of their earnings in
Japan than in other places, or why this multiple increased during the mid-
1980s. Recent data on office space rents and land prices in major metropoli-
tan areas display the pattern of high price-earnings multiples that one
observes in the Japanese stock market. For example, although the price of
residential land in Tokyo is 150 times that in New York City, the monthly rent
8on new commercial office space in Tokyo is only four times that in New York
[Boone and Sachs (1989)]. Rationalizing these patterns requires either
differences in discount rates, or investor expectations that at some future
date rents in Tokyo will rise substantially relative to those in New York.
The time series movements of value-rent ratios and price-earnings ratios
are similar. Although land prices have increased significantly in the last
few years, rents have not. As with equities, the recent changes in land
prices are more difficult to explain than the high level of prices. Ito
(1988) identifies several reasons why land prices in Japan should be high
relative to those in other nations: the tax system places very low burdens on
land, especially in agricultural uses; higher population density makes the
marginal product of land higher than that in many other developed nations; and
the archaic system of land use precludes space-efficient development of high-
rise office buildings and similar structures. None of these factors, however,
seems to have changed during the last decade.
Rather than analyze land values, where data on cash flows and rentals are
difficult to obtain, we focus on the valuation of equities. A successful
explanation for high P/E ratios is also likely to explain the rapid growth in
land prices and the current high price-rental ratio.
3. U.s. and JaDanese Accountina Differences and PIE Ratios
Many explanations of the difference between Japanese and American price-
earnings ratios focus on differences between Japanese and American accounting
conventions. Even if accounting considerations can explain the historical
difference between U.S. and Japanese PIE ratios, two factors make them
unlikely to explain the dramatic growth of this difference during recent
years. First, recent changes in Generally Accepted Accounting Practices
9(CAAP) in Japan have reduced che accounting disparities between Japanese and
American firms [Aron (1981, 1988)]. Second, as Figure 1 shows, the growth in
the Japanese P/E ratio from 29.4 in 1985 to 54.3 in 1988 was dominated by
rising stock prices, rather than by falling earnings. The real price per
share tracks the price-earnings ratio reasonably well: it was roughly constant
from 1970 to 1980, grew gradually during the next five years, and increased
more rapidly in the last three years, with capital gains of 44% in 1986, 9% in
1987, and 41% in 1988. in contrast, real earnings per share were roughly
constant over the 1970-88 period. A 28% decline in earnings per share in 1986
contributed to doubling the PIE ratio during that year, but the PIE remained
above 50.0 in 1987 and 1988 despite annual earnings growth of 26% and 30%.
Even if differences in accounting conventions cannot explain the recent
divergence between Japanese and American PiE ratios, they may explain the
smaller historical disparity in these ratios. Three accounting practices are
particularly important: (i) differences in reporting consolidated versus
parent-company earnings; (ii) differences in "reserve accounts" that permit
Japanese firms to deduct significant amounts from reported earnings as advance
funding for future expenses; and (iii) differences in depreciation practices.
This section discusses each of these differences in turn, and concludes with a
brief analysis of the divergence between accounting and economic profits in
Japan and the United States.
3.1 Consolidation and Intercorporate Ownership
Consolidated earnings, which include the net income of subsidiaries and
of firms in which the parent holds more than 20% of the outstanding equity,
are the dominant measure of earnings in the United States. In contrast,
unconsolidated earnings are the dominant measure in Japan. Unconsolidated
10earnings are the basis for most Japanese market analyses,and they are used in
the denominator of most common Japanese PIE ratios -- includingthe NRI index
reported here. Since unconsolidated earningsreflect the dividends received
from subsidiaries but not their undistributed profits, this leads to a
systematic upward bias in PIE ratios for Japanrelative to those in the U.S.
For Toyota Motor Company, the cross-holding example presentedin Table 2, the
firm's consolidated earnings exceed its unconsolidated (parent) earnings by an
average of 32% per year during the 1986-ES period.
These differential practices can be viewed in two ways. One holdsthat
Japanese earnings are under-reported because theyfail to include the un-
distributed earnings of subsidiaries. This perspective leads to a correction
based on the ratio of consolidated to unconsolidated earnings, as in Aron
(1988). The principal drawback of this strategy is that Japanesefirms have
substantial discretion regarding their consolidated earnings reports, so some
earnings may escapeconsolidation.6
A second approach to this problem, in the spirit of ourearlier adjust-
ment for double-counting of equity holdings, estimates price-earningratios
under the assumption of no cross-holding. Variants of this approach areused
by Ando and Auerbach (1990) and Ueda (1990). The premiseof this approach is
that parent (unconsolidated) earnings are overstated by intercorporate
dividend receipts, but prices are overstated by even more because they
capitalize future intercorporate dividends as well asundistributed earnings
6Since 1984, Japanese GAAP has required firms to report a measure of con-
solidated income that includes the earnings of subsidiaries inwhich the
parent owns more than 20% of the outstanding equity.Subsidiaries in which
the parent holds a smaller stake, as well as those which sum toless than 10%
of consolidated net income, sales, or assets, may still be excluded.Although
firms report consolidated earnings, parent company earnings areused in most
Japanese P/S calculations.
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Table6 shows theimpactof the cross -.hoiding adjustment on Japanese P/E
ratLos between 1975 and 1988. The first column presents the unadjusted P/E
ratio for the NRI35O.The second co1unshowsthe adjstent factor,
(l-s'i)/(1-s54d), and the third column reports the value of (P/E)*. Ir198$,
whentheJapanesepayout ratio (d) was .28 and ps' equalled .407, the adjust-
ment factor ws.669.The cross-holding adjustment therefore reduces the
reported P/Eratiofrom 54.3to36.3. The impact of cross-holdings on the P/E
7W5 study the P/E ratios for the NRI350and S&PIndustrialsat the end of
each calendar year. The S6IPratiodivides earnings for each calendar year by
year-end prices. For the NRI350,the Nomura Research Institute forecasts
vhat earnings will, be in the current fiscal year, which typically .nds in
March, anddividesthese forecasts by December prices. This biases the
Japanese P/E ratio downward relative to the U.S. ratio when earningsare
rising.
12ratio grows through time. This largely reflects an increase in the degree of
cross-holding during the last decade.
3.2 Accounting for Special Reserves
The Japanese tax code allows firms to set aside funds each year in
reserves against future contingencies including product returns, repairs,
payments on guarantees, losses due to doubtful accounts, and payment of
retirement benefits. Japanese workers retire when they are roughly sixty
years old, and their employer typically provides a large one-time retirement
payment. This payment can equal several times the employee's annual salary.
Japanese tax law permits firms to create a reserve equal to 40% of the amount
workers would receive if the firm were liquidated, and all workers retired, at
the close of the fiscal year.
Japanese accounting practices require conformity between tax returns and
financial statements. Thus, when Japanese firms use special reserves to
reduce their taxable income, they reduce their accounting earnings as well.
The net effect of contributing before-tax income to these reserves is a
reduction in reported earnings relative to what they would be in the U.S.
Aron (1988) suggests a procedure for undoing the effect of reserve
contributions on reported earnings. He calculates the net contribution firms





whereis the corporate tax rate. Shoven and Tachibanaki (1987) and Aron
(1988) estimate the combined marginal tax rate from national corporate income
tax, enterprise tax, and local inhabitants tax at between 50 and 55%. We use
a value of r— .52for 1988, with lower levels in earlier periods correspond-
13ing to lower statutory rates on corporate income. We use Arons estimate that
reserve contributions average approximately four percent of net income for
large Japanese firms over the entire 1975-88 period. The resulting adjustment
factor, shown in the fourth column of Table 6, has a small effect on the
reported price-earnings ratio.
3.3 Depreciation Accounting
The last major difference between the accounting practices of U.S. and
Japanese firms concerns depreciation. In the U.S., the possibility of using
one set of accounting rules for tax purposes and another for financial
reporting leads most firms --75%according to Schieneman's (1986) citation of
the tuserican Institute of Certified Public Accountants -- tochoose accelerat-
ed depreciation for the former and straight-line depreciation for the latter.
This reduces current taxable income relative to reported earnings.
Japanese firms, which must use the same depreciation policy for tax and
financial reporting purposes, typically choose tax minimization over the
maximization of reported earnings. Virtually all fins use double-declining
balance depreciation. Since the typical Japanese fin depreciates its assets
more quickly than the typical American firm, Japanese depreciation charges are
higher when assets are relatively new and lower when they are old. Since most
Japanese firms are growing rapidly, they will have a preponderance of young
assets with depreciation deductions in excess of those of comparable U.S.
firms. Reported earnings will therefore be lower for Japanese fins.
Several studies, including Aron (1988), have tried to correct reported
earnings for different depreciation rules by assuming that the ratio of
depreciation to cash earnings should be identical for U.S. and Japanese firms.
Since different depreciation rates are not the only reason for differences in
14the amount of depreciation claimed by U.S. and Japanese firms, however, this
assumption is likely to correct more than just accounting practices. For
example, Japanese firms are more capital-intensive than U.S. firms, so this
adjustment is likely to overstate the true earnings of Japanese firms.
Exact comparison of the depreciation claims of U.S. and Japanese firms
would require detailed information on the asset mix and investment history of
firms in both nations, information which is not readily available. We
therefore employ two alternative procedures for generating comparable depreci-
ation claims for U.S. and Japanese firms. The first provides an upper bound
on the possible differences between firms in the two countries, while the
second is a more reasonable estimate of the depreciation-induced earnings
differential.
Our upper bound procedure, which we label Method I, computes the straight
line depreciation which Japanese firms would have reported if all their assets
had been placed in service during the last year. Under the Japanese tax code,
the annual double-declining balance (DDE) depreciation rate is given by
6—1- 11/L
where L is the asset life in years.8 This rate is approximately equal to
2/L. For example, if L is eight, the 0DB depreciation rate is 25%; if L is
20, 8 is 10.9%. By comparison, the annual straight-line depreciation is l/L
times the original depreciable value. If an asset's estimated salvage value
is zero, the initial depreciable basis is the same for accelerated and
straight-line depreciation. Thus, the DDE depreciation is approximately twice
81f this depreciation rate were used over the life of the asset, the depreci-
ated value would be ten percent of the original value after L years. However,
since the double-declining balance rate is applied to the asset's current book
value, at some point the annual deduction from straight-line depreciation on
the asset's remaining book value will exceed the DDE deduction. The firm may
switch to straight-line depreciation at that time.
15the straight-line depreciation when an asset is first placed in service. Our
upper bound estimate of excess depreciation is therefore half of the reported
DDE depreciation charge, D/2.Ifthisadjustment were correct, then during
periods when accounting depreciation was below tax depreciation, there would
be an increase in the deferred tax account of r*(D/2). The resulting Method I
adjustment to earnings is therefore an increase of (l.r)*D/2. This adjustment
is about the same magnitude as Aron's (1988) adjustment using the ratio of
depreciation to cash flow.
To estimate the importance of the depreciation correction we use the
parent-company accounting reports in the Diawa Analysts Guide, which presents
information on the financial accounts and balance sheets for virtually all
nonfinancial firms listed on the First Section of the TSE. For these firms,
the ratio of (Ereport +(1-.52)*D/2)/Ereport is 1.52 in 1987. Earnings would
therefore be 52% higher under this extreme assumption about the size of the
depreciation adjustment. We use this ratio to correct each year's earnings
for the NRI350.The resulting adjusted P/E ratio is shownincolumnsixof
Table 6. For example, in 1988 the Japanese P/E declines from 36.3 after the
cross-holding correction to 232, still well above the U.S. P/E ratio.
The foregoing method of converting accelerated to straight-line deprecia-
tion is appropriate if all Japanese assets were placed in service during the
previous year. Under more realistic assumptions, however, this estimate
overstates the actual difference between DDB and straight-line depreciation
because it ignores the fact that, while the depreciable basis for the straight
line calculation remains constant, the basis for the DDB calculation declines
as the asset ages.
Our second method of estimating the depreciation-induced understatement
of income, Method II, attempts a more sophisticated correction for the
16difference in depreciable basis between double-declining balance and straight-
line depreciation. We assume that firms have homogeneous assets with identi-
cal economic depreciation rates (6), and that their time path of investment is
described by exponential growth at rate g, which we estimate from the ten-year
growth rate of nominal business investment in the nationalincome accounts.
For such firms, the current DDB depreciation charge per dollar of current
investment is 26 5' g526s ds —261(26+ g). We estimate 6 as one-half
the ratio of current depreciation charges to the value of depreciable assets,
since for Japanese firms using double declining balance methods the instan-
taneous depreciation rate will be approximately twice the economic rate. We
then define L'(8) as the tax lifetime associated with an asset depreciating at
rate 6. We assume L' is the age at which one-half of the asset will beeroded
[L'(6) —(ln2)16]. If depreciation consists of random failures, this
assumption implies that half of all assets live beyond their statedlifetimes.
Using L'(6) we then compute the depreciation per dollar of currentinvestment
under the straight-line assumption; this is f e5 ds/L' —(1
-
Ourcorrection factor for the under-reporting of depreciation is therefore
given by (lr)*[l -(1
-egL')*(26+g)/26gL].
We present the ratio of reported earnings to adjusted earnings in the
seventh columnofTable 6.The results suggest more modest changes than those
implied by the earlier depreciation correction. The earnings adjustment
factor (the ratio of reported to adjusted earnings) is now greater than .90 in
each of the years we examine. This adjustment procedure, which is more
plausible than simply halving the depreciation charges, yields adjusted P/E
ratios of more than thirty for the last three years.
The price-to-cash-earnings (P/CE) ratios reported by MSCI provide
additional perspective on the impact of the different depreciation methods
17used by U.S. and Japanese firms. Since cash earnings are defined as the sum
of reported earnings plus depreciation, they are unaffected by a company's
choice of depreciation method. The U.S. P/CE ratio (not reported) exhibits no
particular trend during 1973-88 and equals 6.5 at the end of 1988. Similarly,
the Japanese price-to-cash-earnings ratio follows no particular pattern
between 1973 and 1982, varying between 5.0 (1974) and 7.7 (1976). It grows
systematically, however, during the last six years of the sample. The ratio
is 9.0 in 1985, 14.4 in 1986, 14.7 in 1987, and 17.2 in 19S8. Like the
adjusted price-earnings ratios in Table 6, recent Japanese price-to-cash-
earnings ratios are unusually high.
3.4 Adjusted American PIE Ratios
The adjustments for depreciation and reserves described above attempt to
make reported earnings of Japanese firms comparable to those of U.S. firms.
The adjustment for intercorporate holdings, however, converts Japanese
earnings to a base case with no intercorporate ownership. Thus, we must also
adjust the P/E ratio of the S&P Industrials to remove the effects of U.S.
intercorporate holdings. The last two co1unns of Table 6 present the unad-
justed S&P P/E ratio and the adjusted series using the procedure we applied to
the Japanese data. Since intercorporate holdings in the U.S. are smaller than
those in Japan. the adjusted P/E ratio (11.7 in 1988) is much closer to the
unadjusted value (12.9).
Although accounting adjustments reduce the differences between Japanese
and American P/E ratios, they do not eliminate them, particularly during the
critical 1986-88 period. For example, the adjustedU.S. PIE ratio is 11.7 at
the end of 1988. The comparable estimates for Japan are 23.2 using deprecia-
tion-adjustment Method 1 and 32.1 using Method 2.Moreover, both of the
18adjusted ratios almost double during 1986. Accounting-based hypotheses can
explain much of the difference between U.S.andJapanese P/Esbefore 1986,but
they cannot explain the doubling of Japanese ratios in 1986 nor the high
levels since then.
3.5 Accounting versus Economic Earnings
The foregoing discussion focused on the comparability of accountin
earnings in the U.S. and Japan. Accounting earnings may not reflect the true
economic earnings that underlie firm value. Deviations between economic and
accounting profits cause reported price-earnings ratios in different nations
to diverge, and changes through time in this deviation could lead to divergent
movements in P/E ratios across nations.
Inflation is the principal source of differences between accounting and
economic earnings. First, because depreciation is calculated using the
historical cost of physical assets, true depreciation costs are understated
and profits are overstated in high inflation periods. Second, the failure to
distinguish between the real and nominal cost of debt understates earnings
during periods of high inflation. Although the economic cost of borrowing is
measured by the real interest rate, reported earnings reflect nominal interest
charges. The higher debt-equity ratios of Japanese than U.S. firms during
much of our sample period makes this overstatement more important for Japanese
than for U.S. earnings. Third, inflation induces spurious profits for goods
held in inventory or for assets which are sold. Nominal appreciation of
inventories is recorded as a profit, even though the firm receives no real
gains. Similar problems arise if the firm sells appreciated assets, since
accounting profits will show the nominal rather than the real capital gain.
19Ando and Auerbach (1988) study the differences between accounting and
economic earnings in Japan and the United States due to the distortions
described above. For the high-inflation period 1967-83, the average reported
earnings/price ratio for their sample of Japanese firms was .065, while that
for their U.S. sample was .094. After correcting earnings for inflation-
induced errors, they find a "corrected" E/P ratio of .092 in Japan and .085 in
the United States. Because of differences in leverage between U.S. and
Japanese firms and differences in depreciation rates, inflation ed to
overstatement of U.S. earnings but understatement of economic earnings for
Japanese firms.
Inflation during thedecadesbefore 1985 caused Japanese P/E ratios to be
higher than they would have been if accountants measured economic earnings,
and had the opposite effect in the United States. While this may further
explain the historical disparity in the level of P/E ratios across countries,
it makes it more difficult to explain the changes since 1985. The slowing of
inflation, which reduced the disparity between accounting and economic
earnings, should have reduced measured Japanese P/E ratios and raised their
U.S. counterparts. This effect is strengthened by the fact that Japanese
inflation rates declined faster than U.S. inflation rates during the period
after 1984. Rather than explaining recent events, the disparity between
economic and accounting earnings therefore magnifies the P/E puzzle.
4. Recuired Returns and Exmected Growth: Jaman and the U.S.
The apparent inability of accounting factors to explain why adjusted
Japanese price-earnings ratios are high in relation to historical values and
in relation to current U.S. P/Es leads us to consider two alternative explana-
tions. First, growth opportunities in Japan may account for a larger fraction
20of firm value than they did in the past and than they do in the U.S. Second,
the required return on equity in Japan may be low relative to its historical
value and relative to the current U.S. rate. This section examines these
explanations for the Japanese stock market boom of the mid-1980's.
4.1 Growth and Required Returns in Infinite and Finite-Horizon Models
Miller and Modigliani (1961), in their classic paper on share valuation,
offer a convenient framework for considering the effect of expected growth and
required returns on price-earnings ratios. In their model, the discount rate
r is constant and firms can invest a fraction k of each period's earnings in
projects that have a perpetual supernormal return of r*. If the firms pay Out
their remaining earnings as dividends, earnings grow at the rate g —kr*while
the supernormal investment opportunities are available.
Under the extreme assumption that the supernormal opportunities are
available forever, Miller and Modigliani show that the value of the price-
earnings ratio is given by
(4) P/E —(l-k)P/D—(lk)/(r.kr*)—(1-k)/(r-g).
realistic assumption that the perpetual supernormal investment




(5) P/E —[1+ kT(r* -r)}/r—[1+ T(g -kr)]/r.
In Table 7 we use these relations, along with the 1985 and 1986 adjusted
P/E ratios, to estimate the implied growth rate g for various required returns
r. Under the extreme assumption that Japanese firms will always be able to
invest their retained earnings in supernormal investment opportunities
(infinite T), the estimated value of r-g in the first panel of Table 7 falls
from 2.25% in 1985 to 1.37% in 1986. This implied change, coupled with the
21large increase in Japanese asset values and P/Es that occurred over this
period, illustrates the non-linearity of equation (6). When the P/E ratio is
large, the implied value of r-g is small and subject to large percentage
changes with relatively small absolute changes. Thus, if we are willing to
assume that supernormal investment opportunities will always be available in
Japan, the doubling of P/Es in 1986 can be explained by a less than one
percentage point decline in the required return or by a similar increase in
the (parpetual) growth rate.
The results for ten and twenty-five years of supernormal growth oppor-
tunities illustrate that the foregoing calculations are sensitive to the
assumption that new opportunities are available forever. Using a long-term
growth forecast of about 4.5% per year (which is comparable to the reported
expectations of Japanese growth for 1985 discussed below) and a horizon of 10
years, the estimates in the lower panel of Table 7 imply that the required
return on Japanese equity was about six percent at the end of 1985. If the
required return remained at six percent, the doubling of the adjusted P/E
ratio from 1985 to 1986 implies a ten percentage point increase in the
expected annual growth rate, to 14.48% per year for the next ten years.
Alternatively, one can hold the expected growth rate fixed at 4.5%. In this
case, equation (5) implies that the required return in Japan fell from about
six percent in 1985 to 3.55% in 1986.
If the supernormal growth opportunities in Japan were expected to persist
for twenty-five years, the implied changes i.n r and g from 1985 to 1986 are
smaller, but they are still substantial. For example, if the expected growth
rate is assumed to be 4.5% in both 1985 and 1986, the implied required return
falls from 6.5% to 4.5%. This decline is more than twice the change implied
by the perpetual growth model.
22With the assusiption that supernormal profits are not available forever,
the doubling of Japanese P/Es in 1986 requires a substantial reduction in
required returns, a substantial reduction in expected growth rates, or both.
Neither growth expectations nor required returns can be measured explicitly,
but in the next two subsections we provide some suggestive evidence on the
movements in these variables during the mid-1980s.
4.2 Evidence on Changing Growth Expectations
Long-term growth forecasts made by econometric forecasting firms provide
some guidance regarding investors' growth expectations. Table 8 presents
long-term forecasts of growth made by Data Resources, Inc., a major U.S.
forecasting firm. Although these forecasts are for real GNF, not corporate
earnings, they provide evidence on the pattern of growth expectations during
the 1980s. There is a small decline in the ten-year forecasts for the U.S.
between 1984 (2.9%) and 1988 (2.3%). The ten-year growth rates forecast for
Japan are surprisingly constant, varying between 4.3% in 1985 and 3.9% in
1988. DRI's five-year forecasts for Japan display somewhat greater volatil-
ity, declining from 4.0% in 1985 to 3.3% in 1987, and then rising to 3.9% in
1988. Five-year forecasts from the Japan Center for Economic Research (4.6%
in 1985, 3.0% in 1986, 3.8% in 1987, and 3.2% in 1988) also suggest that
growth expectations in Japan declined from 1985 to 1986.
These growth forecasts do not support the view that accelerating growth
expectations in Japan are responsible for the 1986 rise in share values. If
anything, the expected growth rate for the next decade declined. Jhile some
might argue that equity values depend on growth forecasts over periods longer
than a decade, revisions in longer-term growth prospects are not likely to
explain the observed price changes. As the horizon grows, forecasts of
23significantly more rapid growth in one economy than in another become less
reliable and less plausible. Recent empirical findings [see Barro (1989)]
suggest that national growth rates exhibit mean reversion. It is also
difficult to imagine the type of news which investors could have received
which would affect growth prospects more than a decade into the future without
changing near-term growth forecasts. Thus, there is little reason to believe
that changes in expected growth can explain the recent increase in Japanese
stock prices.
4.3 Required Returns
The framework presented above demonstrates that P/E ratios depend on both
required equity returns and expected growth rates, Unfortunately, measuring
required returns is even more difficult than calibrating growth expectations.
Ex ante expected returns are not observable, and neither the risk premium on
equities nor the required return on riskiess assets can be estimated precisely
from historical data on asset returns (see Merton (1980)].
Before considering the recent changes in some proxies for required
returns, it is useful to consider the theoretical issue of whether differences
between required returns in the U.S. and Japanese equity markets are consis-
tent with capital market equilibrium. Given the increasing integration of
world financial markets, required returns in each market are linked to those
in other markets. The linkage between U.S. and Japanese financial markets has
grown significantly during the last decade. Prior to 1980, and to a lesser
extent between 1980 and 1986, Japanese investors faced capital controls which
limited their ability to invest in other markets. Since 1986, however,
explicit barriers to capital mobility into and Out of Japan have been minimal.
Recent studies [see Ito (1990) for a survey] suggest that short-term riskiess
24interest rates in Japan are now determined by world market conditions. Whether
markets for long-term assets such as corporate equities are equally well
integrated remains an open issue.
Required equity returns in the U.S. and Japan could differ for at least
three reasons. First, investors may expect systematic long-term changes in
real exchange rates. Frankel (1989) presents evidence of "country effects" in
real interest rates, and argues that these are the result of expected currency
venents. From this perspective, real interest rates and required equity
returns which are lower in Japan than in the U.S. would be Consistent with
expectations that, after adjusting for inflation, the yen will appreciate
against the dollar.
There is little evidence, however, that investors expected real yen
appreciation in the late 1980g. There are twocompetinginterpretations of
the behavior of real exchange rates. One view, supported by evidence in
Rogalski and Vjnso (1977), Roll (1979), and Adler and Lehmann (1983), says
that real exchange rates are essentially random walks. The alternative view,
which is supported by evidence in Frankel (1989) and Cutler, Poterba, and
Summers (1990), says that real exchange rates are mean reverting. Neither
view would have predicted the yen to appreciate in the 1986-88 period.
A second possibility is that perceived risks associated with cross-border
equity investments allow substantial disparities between expected returns in
different markets. Despite large cross-border capital flows during the l980s,
most corporate equity is still held in the country of issue [see French and
Poterba (1990)). In 1988, foreign investors held only 6.5% of the U.S. stock
market and 4.3% of the Japanese market. The cross-border equity flows to date
may therefore be insufficient to equate expected returns. This argument is
25consistent with frequent claims that Japan's high saving rate has reduced
required returns on Japanese assets relative to similar assets in the U.S.
Third, taxation could lead to differences in required returns demanded by
U.S. and Japanese investors. If capital markets are not perfectly integrated,
differences in local tax rates can cause differences in the pretax returns
demanded by investors in each market. In addition, some investors face
different tax burdens on foreign and domestic securities which make them
imperfect substitutes. For example, U.S. pension funds cannoc reclaim the 2O
dividendwithholding tax which Japan levies on dividend payments to foreign
investors. Similar problems may affect some Japanese investors since the U.S.
also requires 20% withholding on dividends remitted abroad.
The foregoing considerations make it impossible to determine on a priori
grounds whether there are differences between the expected returns on long-
term assets in Japanese and U.S. capital markets.1.Je therefore consider the
available empirical evidence on long-term real interest rates in the two
nations in an effort to evaluate required returns on riskless assets: we do
not attempt to measure the equity risk premium.
Nominal interest rates in both Japan and the United States declined sig-
nificantly between 1985 and 1988. Table 8 reports the nominal rates on both
U.S. and Japanese ten-year government bonds during 1980-88. Japanese long-
term rates declined by 150 basis points from 1985 to 1988, a factor which is
often cited [for example by Takagi (1989)] as influential in the rise in
equity and land prices. However, the significant increase in Japanese prices
and price/earnings ratios (or price/rent ratios) during this period must be
explained by changes in real, not nominal interest rates.
Macroeconomic forecasts of long-term Japanese inflation rates suggest
that real interest rates also declined in the mid-l980s. The sixth and
26seventh columns of Table 8 report estimates of real yields calculated by
subtracting Data Resources' long-term forecast of annual inflation from the
contemporaneous nominal yield on government bonds. These estimates suggest
that the real Japanese interest rate declined from4.1%in 1985 to 2.9% i
1986. Similar estimates based on the five-year inflation forecast of the
Japan Center for Economic Research suggest a real interest rate of 4.4% in
1985 and 3.1% in 1986, a decline of about 125 basis points during the year
when P/E ratios doubled.
There is an even larger decline in real interest rates in the U.S. DRI's
ten-year inflation forecasts imply that the real yield on U.S. government
bonds fell from 4.4% in 1985 to 2.6% in 1986, a drop of 280 basis points.
The real interest rates in Table 8 also show that, prior to the removal of
capital controls in the mid-l980s, estimated real long-term interest rates in
Japan were more than 150 basis points lower than those in the U.S.
The substantial changes in crude measures of required returns on long-
term riskiess assets suggest that required returns on corporate equities also
declined, both in Japan and the United States, during the 1985-86 period. The
key questions are whether the decline in required returns is consistent with a
much smaller increase in U.S. than Japanese prices and P/E ratios given the
substantially larger decline in the U.S. rate, and whether the decline in
required returns in Japan is large enough to explain the Japanese P/E rise.
Several factors might explain why U.S. prices and price/earnings ratios
increased less than their Japanese counterparts. First, the relation linking
prices to required returns and expected growth rates is not linear. Since the
U.S. P/Es began at a lower level, the same absolute change in required returns
should have a larger effect in Japan than in the U.S.
27Second, the rise in U.S. PIE ratios may have been blunted by tax changes
in 1986. These changes lowered marginal tax rates on interest and dividend
income for top-bracket individual investors from 70% to 28%. Part of the
reduction in the tax burden on dividends, however, was offset by an increase
in capital gains tax rates. For individual investors the net effect of the
tax changes should have been a substitution toward debt and away from equity.
In contrast, for an important class of Japanese investors, tax changes
dr.ng theid-l9SOsreducedafter-taxreturns on debt relative to thoseon
commonstock. Before 1987,Japanese individual investors were able to avoid
taxation on interest through a system of Maruyuaccounts.Each individual
could receive tax-exempt interest on up to 14 million yen in assets, or
roughly $112,000 ($448,000 for a family of four). These limits did not affect
the many households who evaded taxation by establishing multiple accounts [see
Nagano (1988)), and by the mid-l980's, nearly 70% of Japan's personal savings
were exempt from taxation [Japan Securities Research Institute (1988)].
The Maruyu system was largely eliminated by the 1987 Japanese tax reform.
Prime Minister Nakasone appointed an Advisory Tax Commission in September
1985. In April 1986 the commission made an interim report suggesting aboli-
tionof Maruyu accounts, and legislation was introduced to the Japanese
parliamentin early 1987 and passed in September. Since the abolition of
these accounts for most investors on April1, 1988, households face a 20% tax
onall interest income. These Japanese tax changes should have induced a
substitution from debt to equity among some Japanese investors, possibly
raising stock prices.9
9These tax changes did not affect the institutional shareholders who con-
stitute a significant part of Japanese equity holdings.
28Although these factors might explain why Japanese stock prices and P/Es
increased by more than their U.S. counterparts, movements in required returns
seem unable to explain why Japanese P/Es doubled in 1986. The behavior of
long-term government bonds yields suggests that real riskless rates fell by
about 1.25 percentage points during 1985-86. We are unaware of any evidence
to suggest that equity risk premiums also fell during this period. In the
Miller-Modigliani growth model, if supernormal investment opportunities were
expected to persist for 25 years and earnings were expected to grow by 45%
per year, a 1.25% decline in the required return implies that the adjusted P/E
should have increased from 18.2 in 1985 to 27.7 in 1986. This implied value
is much lower than our actual adjusted estimate of 35.7 for 1986.
The behavior of Japanese real interest rates in early 1990 also suggests
that movements in required returns were not the only factor driving up
Japanese stock prices and price/earnings ratios in 1985-86. Real interest
rates increased by approximately 1.0% in January 1990. If the argument that
movements of this magnitude were central in pushing up share prices is
correct, prices should have fallen more sharply in the 1990 episode than they
have at this writing.
S. Conclusions
The dramatic difference between reported price-earnings ratios in the
United States and Japan is not as puzzling as it appears at first glance.
Roughly half of the discrepancy is caused by differences in the accounting
practices of the two countries. If Japanese firms used U.S. accounting
practices, we estimate that the P/E ratio for the Tokyo Stock Exchange would
have dropped from its reported value of 54.3 to 32.1 at the end of 1988.
Accounting differences explain much of the persistent disparity between U.S.
29and Japanese price-earnings ratios, but they appear unable to explain the
doubling of Japanese P/E ratios in 1986, from 29.4 to 58.6.
Because Japanese stocks traded at high earnings multiples prior to the
recent run-up, relatively small changes in either discount rates or growth
expectations could lead to large changes in prices. We find no evidence of
upward revisions in expected growth rates for the Japanese economy during this
period. There is evidence of a substantial drop in required riskiess returns
betan 1985 and 1966. but the decline appears to be too small to expa.n P/E
movements as large as the actual changes.
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33Table 2: Equity Held by Toyota Motor Company, 1988
Toyota
Company Name Ownership Share Net Income (Y mu)
KantoAuto Works 49.0% 2,500
Toyota Auto Body 41.7%* 2,300
Chiyoda Fire & Marine Insurance 41.4% 6.100
Toyoda Gosei (steering wheels & hoses) 40.0% 2,400
Kyowa Leather 32.4%* 1,600
Tokai Rika (Switches & Seat Belts) 27.8% 1,500
Toyota Automatic Loom Works 24.9% 10,100
Toyoda Machine Works 24.7% 1,600
Toyota Tsusho (Trading) 23.2%* 5,400
ippor.denso (Auto Electronics) 22.5%* 28,000
Koyo Seiko (Bearings) 22.3% 3,300
Aichi Steel 21.8% 3,150
Aisin Seiki (Autoparts) 21.3%* 7,500
Chuo Spring 20.5% 1,070
Koito Manufacturing (Auto lights) 19.8% 2,900
Daihatsu 15.0% 4,000
Akebono Brake 15.0% 1,250
Futaba Industrial (Mufflers) 14.3% 2,350
Shiroki (Auto Interiors) 11.6% 1,000
Hino Motors (Trucks) 11.0% 4,300
Toyoda Spinning & Weaving 8.9%* 400
Kayaba Industrial (Hydraulics) 8.4% 1,200
Nippon Piston Ring 8.6% 580
Ichikoh Industries (Auto lights) 7.5% 1,400
Nachi-Fujikoshi (Bearings) 5.9% 1,100









Source: Authors' tabulations from JaDan Comanv Handbook, Spring 1988.
Starred entries indicate substantial ownership by other firms affiliated with
Toyota Motors, usually Toyota Automatic Loom.
34Table 3: Market Value of Japanese and U.S. Equity Markets, 1970-88
Total Market Value Adjusted Market Value Fraction of Total
(Billions of Dollars) (Billions of Dollars) World Equities
Year Japan U.S. Japan U.S. Japan US,
1970 42.5 636.4 25.2 671.8 2.8 74.1
1971 67.2 741.8 39.8 784.7 3.7 72.3
1972 152.3 871.5 81.6 890.3 6.2 68.1
1973 128.6 721.0 69.2 668.2 6.6 63.7
1974 115.8 510.4 63.7 436.]. 8.1 55.8
1975 135.1 683.6 75.9 660.8 6.9 60.3
1976 179.3 856.4 100.0 786.2 8.2 64.4
1977 205,1 793.9 116.1 742.1 9.3 59.5
1978 327.3 816.7 183.0 787.6 12.6 54.0
1979 274.0 960.2 153.2 923.5 9.1 55.1
1980 356.6 1240.0 200.8 1179.9 9.5 56.0
1981 402.7 1145.4 225.1 1106.7 11.2 54.9
1982 410.2 1308.3 232.2 1281.5 10.8 59.7
1983 519.2 1578.3 286.6 1506.3 11.2 59.0
1984 616.8 1593.2 327.5 1477.6 12.9 58.2
1985 909.1 1955.4 480.0 1845.7 13.7 52.7
1986 1746.2 2203.2 883.6 2187.2 18.5 45.9
1987 2978.2 2216.1 1489.1 2173.8 26.5 38.7
1988 3840.2 2480.9 1920.1 2397.1 28.7 35.9
Note: The total equity value for Japan is from Tokyo Stock Exchange, Monthly
Statistical Report, and the value for the U.S. is from NYSE, NASDAQ, and SEC
sources described in the text. The adjusted market values exclude intercor-
porate equity holdings. Our estimates of each country's weight in the world
equity portfolio ignore all cross-holdings except those in Japan and the U.S.
35Table 6: Price-Earnings Ratios, Dividend-Price Ratios (in Percent),
Foreign Equity Holdings (in Percent), and Debt-Equity Ratios,
Japan and the United States, 1970-1988
Price/Earnin2S Dividend/PriceForeign Holdings Debt/Equity
Year JaoarLU.S. JapanU.S. JapanU.S. Japar U.S.
1970 9.0 18.6 3. 3.3 4.9 3.7 1.63 .54
1971 13.5 18.7 3.9 2.9 5.2 3.6 2.13 .50
1972 23.3 19.3 2.4 2.5 4.5 4.0 2.23 .48
1973 13.9 12.3 2.1 3.4 4.0 4.3 1.38 .69
1974 16.5 7.9 2.7 5.0 3.2 4.5 1.44 1.04
1975 25.2 11.8 2.5 3.8 3.6 4.8 2.13 .78
1976 22.0 11.2 2.1 3.7 3.7 4.7 1.88 .72
1977 19.3 9.1 2.3.0 3.0 4.6 1.2
1978 21.5 8.2 1.7 5.2 2.7 4.7 1.62 .91
1979 16.6 7.5 1.8 5.3 3.0 4.6 L78 .83
1980 17.9 9.6 1.6 4.4 5.8 4.8 1.59 .64
1981 24.9 8.2 1.5 5.3 6.4 5.1 1.64 .76
1982 23.7 11.9 1.4 4.6 7.6 5.3 1.44 .70
1983 29.4 12.6 1.2 3.7 8.3 5.6 1.03 .62
1984 26.3 10.4 1.2 4.1 8.8 5.6 .93 .74
1985 29.4 15.4 1.2 3.4 7.4 5.9 .71 .66
1986 58.6 18.7 0.8 3.0 7.0 6.7 .45 .65
1987 50.4 14.1 0.8 3.2 5.3 7.0 .43 .71
1988 54.3 12.9 0.6 3.0 4.8 7.2 .36* .71*
Source: Entries reflect values on last trading day of each year. Foreign
holdings of U.S. equity are from the Federal Reserve Board Flow ofFunds
tables. Foreign holdings of Japanese equity are from the Tokyo Stock Ex-
change, with 1988 value estimated from monthly net sales data inMonthly
Statistics Report. The debt-equity ratio is defined as the book value of debt
divided by the market value of equity. The debt-equity ratios for the U.S.
are from the Federal Reserve Board, Balance Sheets of the U.S. Economy, 1988.
The debt-equity ratios for Japan for 1970-75 are from Ando and Auerbach
(1988). Ratios for 1976-87 are based on the data for "All Industries" in
Daiwa (1980, 1984, 1987, and 1988). Starred values for 1988 are the authors'
estimates.












L.and 464.0 553.8 221.7 403.4
Plant & Equipment 2644.9 3021.4 206.4 274.5
Inventories 740.9 809.7 55.8 53.5
Source: U.S. Federal Reserve Board, Balance Sheets of the U.S. Economy, and
Japan Economic Planning Agency, Annual Report on National Accounts. The
Japanese firms Consist of nonfinancial corporate enterprises excluding public
enterprises, whose asset holdings are computed as the difference between
closing asset stocks of the general government and those of public institu-
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Table 7: The Implied Difference between the Required Return r
and the Growth Rate g with Perpetual Growth Opportunities (Panel A)
arid the Implied Growth Rate with Supernormal Investment Opportunities
of Various Durations, T (Panel B), Japan and U.S., 1985 and 1986
Panel A: The Implied Difference between the
Japanese Required Return r and the GrowthRateg
Assuming Perpetual Growth Opportunities
r—g P/E k
Japan:1985 2.25 18.2 0.59
Japan:1986 1.37 35.7 0.51
U.S. :1985 2.59 14.2 0.49
U.S. :1986 3.20 17.5 0.44
Panel B: The Implied Growth Rate with Supernormal Investment
Opportunities of Various Durations, T
Required Return, r
T 3.0 3.5 4.0 4.5 5.0 5.5 6.0 6.5 7.0
Japan: 1985
10 —2.77—1.56—0.36 0.84 2.05 3.25 4.46 5.67 6.87
25 —0.05 0.61 1.27 1.93 2.59 3.25 3.91 4.57 5.23
0.75 1.25 1.75 2.25 2.75 3.25 3.75 4.25 4.75
Japan: 1986
10 2.24 4.28 6.32 8.36 10.4012.44 14.48 16.5218.56
25 1.83. 2.78 3.75 4.72 5.69 6.66 7.63 8.60 9.57
1.63 2.13 2.63 3.13 3.63 4.13 4.63 5.13 5.63
U.S. :1985
10 —4.27 —3.31 —2.36 —1.41—0.45 0.50 1.46 2.41 3.37
25 —0.83 —0.30 0.23 0.76 1.29 1.82 2.35 2.88 3.41
—0.59 —0.09 0.41 0.91 1.41 1.91 2.41 2.91 3.41
U.S. :1986
10 —3.43—2.33—1.24—0.15 0.95 2.05 3.14 4.23 5.33
25 —0.58—0.01 0.56 1.13 1.70 2.27 2.84 3.41 3.98
—0.20 0.30 0.80 1.30 1.80 2.30 2.80 3.30 3.80
Source: The estimates in Panel A and the infinite horizon estimates in Pa
are calculated using equation (4) in the text, P/E(l-k)/(r-g). The
timates for 10— and 25-year horizons are calculated using equation (5)
P/E=[1+T(g-kr)]/r.
39Table 8: Expected Annual Growth Rates and Nominal and Real Yields on
Long-Term Government Bonds, the United States and Japan, 1980-88
1982 3.2 4.6 10.32 7.81 4.0 2.4
1983 3.2 3.8 11.43 7.42 5.6 4.2
1984 2.9 3.7 4.0 11.51 6.85 4.4
1985 2.9 4.0 4.3 9.05 6.32 4.4 4.1
1986 2.6 3.6 7.26 5.51
1987 2.3 3.3 8.91 5.15 3.9 3.3
1988 2.3 3.9 3.9 9.18 4.80 4.1 3.0
Notes: The U.S. long-term growth forecasts are from the winter issues of Data
Resources, Inc.'s Lone Term Review. For example, the 1980 forecast is from the
winter 1980-81 issue. Japanese growth forecasts are from various issues of the
Data Resources/Nikkei Jaoanese Review. Nominal yields are for the Nikkei
Long-Term Government Bond Index and the Moody's 10-year Government Bond Index.
The "real" yields are calculated by subtracting DRI's long-term inflation
forecast from the contemporaneous nominal yield.
U.S.
10-Year
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